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El Salvador and the bureaucracy of earthquake relief

A personal account from Marta Viscarra

People already know the details about the magnitude and intensity of the damage done by the earthquake. Specifically, the communities with whom we share brotherhood in Usulatan almost all experienced the greatest misfortune especially Tierra Blanca and San Marcos Lempa.

In Bajo Lempa there were various communities affected, such as La Babilonia, where the dikes built with such sacrifice by the people for protection from the flooding of the Lempa River, were inundated and damaged when the earthquake caused the river to overflow its banks.

Every small and mid-size old house fell apart, the wells collapsed because they lost the water veins in nearly 22 communities. The CEBES Pastoral Centre in Nueva Esperanza (the meeting centre for the Zone) was left badly damaged; its central meeting plaza was destroyed and the rooms with their collapsed walls became uninhabitable, including those in the church where, that day, Nicaraguan artists had begun to paint a mural on the front door.

In San Salvador, there were many people with basic needs but, because of the bureaucracy, aid did not arrive. The only available aid (which was very little) was what the municipalities and parishes could send.

There were people living far from the central locations and were isolated without any kind of help. In the Feria Internacional de Toda, all the aid was warehoused and to be released had to pass through a bureaucratic "funnel." To acquire any aid, sensitive people had to humble themselves and beg for it.

I had the opportunity to accompany various families to solicit aid. They were the isolated ones whom nobody helped. To begin with, the police guarding the entrances did not let anyone enter except on a whim or those they saw were well dressed. When I entered, I received the first shock with the military police. They did not let anyone enter without a struggle with the police. People were pushed from one side to the other without anyone succeeding.

At the end of the line where they were registering for aid and asked all kinds of questions, when people wanted to know what time and where they would receive aid, they were told "in four or five days." They asked why so long when they needed it today and had children sleeping outdoors in the harsh weather. The response was that nothing could be done, they were just following orders. When I asked what would happen to the applications, I was told that someone would arrive to take supplies to COEN (Comite de Emergencia Nacional). There, a supervisor would review the request and approve and sign it. Then another person would pass it on to the SNF (Secretaria Nacional de la Familia) which was presided over by the President’s wife. From there it had to pass to agents to be signed. So far, the total amount of aid handed out was nothing.

This great bureaucratic journey was for the purpose of showing that it was thanks to the president’s wife that they were receiving this aid. She visited one community per day with aid so that people could see pictures and television coverage of her delivering the aid that others had given!

"This is really shameful," said Sr. Ferrer, the director of COEN. "While supplies are kept in storage, people are getting sick from sleeping in the street and are being bitten by all kinds of animals."

On the road, we joined other people who had the same experience of not receiving aid. We finished our tour where the media were present and denounced the trouble publicly on Channel 12 where others had also denounced the violation of their right to receive aid.

I promised that these things would be made known internationally to sensitive people who would give an account of how the government is importing hunger and suffering to the people. We demand that the government not withhold aid from the people who need it. The mayors must alleviate the suffering of the population but the central government controls all the aid.

There are many Non-Government Organizations that are acting to aid El Salvador and I believe we can trust them. The Salvadoran Communities are working with Oxfam, Alternatives, Developpement et Paix.

Well, I hope to have another chance to continue telling about other facets of this voyage that, without my wanting it, has turned into an Odyssey.

With affection,

Marta Viscarra

 

 

Avoidable crises in El Salvador

By Brian Rude

El Salvador does not need a dramatic earthquake to expose the fragility of its infrastructure, or the vulnerability of its population. Over the past five months, the ever-suffering Salvadoran people has limped from one crisis to the next, each of them perhaps inevitable, considering governmental and business mentalities and inadequacies, but each also certainly avoidable, if appropriate and normal measures had only been taken to prevent them. "It is better to prevent, rather than lament," Salvadorans often say--a proverb expressing their folk wisdom. But the reverse is more commonly the reality they are forced to live.

Last September, many Salvadoran parents were in sorrow, and many more were fearful, due to the dengue epidemic that claimed the lives of 36 children. Massive public education and fumigation campaigns followed, to eradicate the mosquitoes responsible for the infections, and their many breeding grounds. But nothing could be done to revive the 36 children or to restore them to their grieving families. As usual, the modus operandi was one of reaction, rather than prevention.

In October, the vulnerable sector shifted. Suddenly, alcoholics were at risk. Literally overnight, dozens of drunks died of alcohol poisoning in San Vicente. In spite of the shock, many Salvadorans continued to sell and buy, drink and die. In the end, 128 alcoholics in numerous communities had succumbed to the cheap, adulterated liquor, at the hands of businesspeople interested in economizing in the production or avoiding taxes. No state of national grieving was declared to mourn their loss.

November’s economic and social tremor was the “dollarization” strategy announced suddenly by President Flores. The timing seemed a strategic ploy to divert attention from the polemic and embarrassing debate into which he had entered with President (“Dictator”) Fidel Castro days earlier, over who was behind international terrorism, at the Latin American presidents’ summit in Venezuela .

When this earthquake struck--when this “Monetary (Dis)Integration” law went into effect--on 01 January, 2001 (immediately following the Christmas / New Year’s vacation, adding to public confusion and unpreparedness) it quickly became evident that the intent would be to eventually, within a few months, replace the colón with the US dollar, not simply offer the dollar as an alternative. Such “decolonization” appears to much of the population to be, rather, another face of “colonization” (“Colón” is Spanish for “ Columbus ”), or recolonization, another historic step in shifting from Spanish to US domination / allegiance. There is much speculation and apprehension as to what the next steps in this process might be, and growing resistance to the measure--an unconstitutional measure, according to many analysts--imposed so abruptly and without consultation.

In the days prior to the earthquake, El Salvador was immersed in another health crisis. Seven thousand children were suffering from diarrhea as a result of the rotavirus. Seven of them had died, and Salvadoran parents were again experiencing sorrow, fear and vulnerability.

And who in El Salvador has the means to defend themselves against crime? It could be organized crime or delinquency; spontaneous assaults or well-planned kidnappings; urban or rural; daytime or nighttime; rich or poor; children or seniors; at home or in some office; walking or driving; in one´s car or on a bus . . . . Evidently the government, the courts, the PNC (National Civil Police) or the Armed Forces don’t have the answer. Many speculate to what extent they have been the problem, and will continue to be the problem, in spite of the much-publicized purging campaigns currently being carried out. Statistics continue to indicate up to 150 (166 for males aged 20-24) violent deaths per 100,000 inhabitants per year--the highest in the hemisphere, if not the world.

The basic equation is always the same: the dollar is infinitely more valuable than human life. Evidence of this surrounds us each day. By Monday, 15 January, construction companies were back to work, urbanizing “La Cima”, an ecologically vulnerable area unnervingly close to Las Colinas. Workers were obligated to report for work, reluctantly abandoning their families in precarious post-earthquake conditions, but unable to risk the probability of forfeiting their employment in this precarious economy of high unemployment.

The 538 landslides caused by the earthquake of 13 January, burying the middle-class neighbourhood of Las Colinas II, and 97 rural, much humbler communities, are only a more earthy and dramatic manifestation of the figurative landslides which bury Salvadorans repeatedly. Nobody knows when or where they might strike; nobody knows how to prevent them or where to flee to escape them. But everybody knows that they have been victimized by them before, and that they will be victimized by them again. “This is the will of God. We must accept it,” is often their resigned response--an attitude as tragic as the landslides themselves.

It is simple wisdom. If one claws away persistently at the base of any structure--be it the mountain range “La Cordillera del Balsamo”, which slid over Las Colinas II, converting the neighbourhood into a cemetery in seconds, or be it the political, judicial, economic and social structure of the country--it is certain to collapse eventually, destroying those in its path. But those responsible for such constant erosion don’t seem to care. And they clearly don’t learn from previous landslides. The virtual judicial impunity that they enjoy in El Salvador is one major factor behind their belligerence.

Alongside the fatalism of much of the population thrives an attitude of hope, a determination to overcome, to start all over again, to rebuild from the rubble. Despair is not an option. “Despair is the luxury of the ‘first world’, one which we poor cannot afford,” as one campesino so wisely and prophetically reflected during El Salvador ’s civil war. God knows, and Salvadorans know, that El Salvador is no place to indulge in such a luxury.

Brian Rude is a Canadian (mostly Albertan), serving as pastor/ missionary in El Salvador and the Americas for the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada , since 1988.  For the past six years, he has focused on AIDS ministry in prisons and Roman Catholic parishes--mostly awareness and prevention, but also pastoral accompaniment, especially at Rosales Public Hospital .

 

 

The IMF on Canada : it likes the cuts in corporate taxes

it hates the employment insurance benefits, especially in the poorest regions of the country

The 2001 “Article IV” Consultation on Canada -
Statement of the IMF Mission, January 31, 2001

The IMF is happy that “improvements in the employment insurance system and in incentives for low-income working families, and the measures taken to bring the public old-age support system into actuarial balance have enhanced economic efficiency. All of these policies have paid off in the past few years with inflation and inflation expectations being maintained at low levels despite a marked acceleration in output and employment growth and a sharp decline in unemployment.” But...

It wants to see more cuts in employment insurance benefits, through “measures to reduce the frequency of EI use (such as experience rating of the EI premium rate, which would tie the rate for individual firms directly to the use of the system by their workers) and the elimination of regional extended benefits.”

The IMF also likes the cuts in taxes on corporations, and “commends the authorities for the comprehensive income tax reforms and reductions introduced in the 2000 Budget and in the October 2000 Economic Statement and Fiscal Update and strongly endorses the fiscal policy framework that has been put in place... The corporate income tax cuts, when fully implemented, will help bring average business taxation below current levels in the United States , significantly enhancing the competitiveness of Canadian firms.

 

 

Signs of hope in Mexico says Don Samuel Ruiz, Bishop Emeritus of San Cristobal de Las Casas

In January, Don Samuel Ruiz, Bishop Emeritus of San Cristobal de Las Casas, visited Montreal and gave several talks on human rights as part of the SJC’s continuing celebration of its twenty-fifth year. It seemed appropriate and inspiring that both of his presentations -- to a group of Concordia and McGill students in the afternoon and to a larger audience at St. Edmund of Canterbury Church in Beaconsfield in the evening -- ended on a note of hopefulness.

Don Samuel sees real signs of hope in the fact that the government of Vicente Fox has taken important steps towards meeting the Zapatistas' conditions for the resumption of peace negotiations - that the Army has been withdrawn from four* of the seven points named by the Zapatistas, that the COCOPA proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture has been sent by the President to the Congress, and that nineteen* Zapatista prisoners have been released from jail. He points out, however, that the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture are the first stage in a seven-part negotiation process. The next stage is to be Democracy and Justice. The final stage will address the question of the EZLN's ceasing to be an armed movement and becoming incorporated into Mexican political life as a movement or as a party. (*These were the figures as of January 18th.)

Don Samuel did not make light of existing problems. He is very aware of the structural injustices that gave rise to the Zapatista uprising and which continue to exist - in Chiapas and elsewhere. Emphasizing the importance of social commitment, he said that a key question is not whether or not President Fox will fulfill his electoral promises but rather what will be the efforts of civil sociey to oblige President Fox to keep his word.

During his talk in Beaconsfield , Don Samuel spoke of the dictum often quoted by development NGOs: "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime." Situating the dictum in its structural context, Don Samuel pointed out that the newly trained fisherman would become an especial target for unscrupulous suppliers of fishing equipment and for greedy fish buyers trying to corner the fish market. He thus implied that attempts at social change are pointless unless the roots of structural injustice are addressed.

In response to a specific question on the projected Free Trade Area of the Americas , he remarked that such agreements are no more and no less than the current phase of a capitalist system that produces poverty and concentrates wealth. This system has to be combated with counter-proposals based on human values rather than economic values. The capitalist system has two principal weaknesses. Firstly, it depends upon growth and increased consumption but has less and less need of workers; and unemployed workers are not in a position to increase their consumption. Secondly, in order to increase production it must ravage the environment and threaten the basis of human existence.

Don Samuel pointed out some of the links between events in Chiapas and what is happening internationally. The indigenous peoples in Chiapas are victims of the global economic system. It is not coincidental that the four Chiapas municipalities that form the core of support for the Zapatista uprising are inhabited by small coffee growers who were particularly hard hit by the drastic decline in world coffee prices. Conversely, if the San Andrés Accords become part of the Mexican Constitution, a positive precedent could be set for work in other countries on questions of autonomy in pluri-ethnic societies.

Everybody who attended one of Don Samuel's presentations was impressed by his warmth, his humour, and his modesty. He did not spare himself in describing how, in his early years as Bishop, he came to realize that he himself was unwittingly part of the system that oppresses and represses the indigenous people of Chiapas . He spoke of the historic importance of the movement of the indigenous peoples in all of the Americas , of how they are now becoming the subjects of their own history and are leading the social struggle against neoliberalism.

 

 

Background on Bishop Ruiz and Chiapas , Mexico

Chiapas is a state that is rich in natural resources - oil, hydro-electric power, and agricultural products such as coffee. Its indigenous peoples do not share in its wealth. Like indigenous people elsewhere in Mexico , they suffer from malnutrition, inadequate or non-existent health care, illiteracy, and inadequate housing. The neoliberal reforms that preceded Mexico ’s entry into NAFTA have exacerbated this situation.

Rural people in Chiapas , as elsewhere, have suffered from the government’s cuts in programmes supporting small farmers. With the ending of the agrarian reform programme, indigenous communities with insufficient land have seen an end to their hopes of acquiring more land. Existing social landholding has become insecure, following the reforms to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which allow for the privatization of community-held or ejidal land. Such lands can now be sold, rented, or mortgaged, or used in business ventures involving commercial interests outside the community or ejido.

In 1974, the Diocese of San Cristobal arranged the now historic Indigenous Congress, The demands which were eloquently and dramatically expressed by the two thousand representatives of the four main indigenous peoples of the state (Chol, Tojolabal, Tzeltal, Tzotzil) for land, education, fair trading conditions for their produce, roads, health care, and the withdrawal of the army from the communities, are still valid. Essentially, they are the same demands the Zapatistas made some twenty years later and still being made today. The Indigenous Congress participants also reported that this situation of social or structural injustice was compounded by the arbitrary behaviour of the state authorities and the security forces, whose members frequently committed illegal acts such as extortion and robbery, as well as by the armed violence that was used by the landlords and the politically powerful to defend their own interests.

Although a number of social organizations close to the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, such as Las Abejas, have not accepted the Zapatistas’ decision to engage in armed struggle against social injustice, there has been widespread support for the Zapatistas’ social demands. It is important to note that in the eyes and actions of the previous government all independent organizations were considered as enemies – at best being excluded from government social programmes; and at worst becoming the targets of paramilitary violence or military harassment.

The present time

The Zapatistas have expressed a willingness to enter into negotiations with the newly-inaugurated government of President Vicente Fox, provided that three conditions are met: 1) that the Mexican Army is withdrawn from seven specifically named checkpoints close to Zapatista civilian communities (at this time, withdrawal has taken place from only four out of the seven); 2) that the Mexican Congress approve a bill that will put into effect the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, an agreement that was signed but never honoured by the Zedillo government and that had marked the end of the first stage in the peace negotiations between the Zapatistas and the government. The bill itself was drawn up in 1996 by the multi-party Peace and Agreement Commission (COCOPA); it was accepted by the Zapatistas but rejected by President Zedillo.

It was the government’s unwillingness to honour the San Andrés Agreement, as well as the increasing paramilitary violence in northern Chiapas , which led to the Zapatistas’ withdrawal from the peace negotiations. The Zapatistas’ offer to the Fox government comes after years of unarmed resistance by their civilian supporters and many months of silence on the part of their leadership. At this very moment, the Zapatista leadership is preparing to take the historic step of going to Mexico City to appeal for congressional approval of the COCOPA bill on indigenous rights and culture.

This appears to be a time of both hopefulness and watchfulness. Hopefulness because of the chance of renewed peace negotiations, made possible by an apparent governmental openness and by the Zapatistas’ willingness to respond to a governmental overture. Watchfulness because at this time the military withdrawal announced by President Fox has been more apparent than real. Few soldiers have actually been transferred from Chiapas . The valid demand on the part of human rights and some social organizations that the army be withdrawn to its pre-1994 (that is to say, pre-Zapatista uprising) positions is far from being met. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the encounter between the Zapatistas (and the social organizations which sympathize with their demands) and the government can almost certainly only be a meeting between two different social visions - leading to an agreement to disagree in the political arena rather than on the battlefield. Such an agreement would involve both the hopefulness surrounding the beginning of a new phase of peaceful struggle against neoliberalism and the watchfulness derived from the awareness that the advocates of neoliberalism will spare no pains in their efforts to defeat and discredit their political opponents.

 

 

Protest in Ecuador escalates – indigenous peoples and citizen’s groups call for repeal of IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies

Government responds with repression, several indigenous people killed or wounded, hundreds arrested

by Stephanie Weinberg at DevelopmentGAP and the International Secretariat of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) - February 6, 2001

Indigenous peoples in Ecuador have been mobilizing over the past month to demand the repeal of new IMF-backed economic measures announced by the Ecuadoran government in late December as part of an ongoing structural adjustment program. The measures involve the removal of subsidies on cooking fuel and gasoline, causing the former to double in price and the latter to increase by 25%, and a 75% increase in transportation costs.

The IMF's insistence on the application of these measures -- as well as a 3% increase in the value-added tax which is still pending -- has put access to dignified living conditions even further beyond the reach of large segments of the Ecuadoran population. The escalating protests in recent days are not only in response to these economic measures but to the overall structural adjustment program that has intensified with Ecuador 's conversion to the US dollar last year.

Beginning on 21 January, indigenous groups led by CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador) organized marches and blockaded roads in the countryside and cities in half of the country's 22 provinces. Farmworkers, students and others also joined in supporting these protests. The government sent military forces to disperse many of these peaceful demonstrations with force, using teargas and weapons, that resulted in several indigenous people injured, some by bullets, and several hundred arrested.

In response, on 26 January, indigenous organizations called for a national mobilization from communities across the country and a convergence on the nation's capital, Quito . The government responded with further repression. Quito was militarized when as many as 10,000 indigenous people arrived over the course of several days. After gathering on the grounds of the Polytechnic University , they were surrounded by military troops who have cut off water and electricity and have intermittently been stopping food and medicine from being brought in and indigenous people from leaving.

Attempts at dialogue between indigenous leaders and the government have failed to produce any results, as the government has shown no willingness to discuss economic policy or refrain from using force against peaceful protest. Indigenous leaders have presented a series of demands, including an end to the repression and an open dialogue on economic policy, and insist on meeting directly with President Noboa. The government responded by declaring a state of national emergency on 2 February, suspending citizens' basic constitutional rights -- including freedom of association and mobilization, as well as protection from arbitrary search and seizure.

Several dozen indigenous people then escalated their protest by beginning a hunger strike. While tensions have mounted in Quito , road blockades and marches have nearly

paralyzed 12 provinces. The use of force by 300 troops to disburse the blockade of a bridge in the Amazon region on 5 February resulted in at least two indigenous people killed by gunfire, including a 14-year-old who was shot in the head, and some 20 wounded. Nevertheless, 5,000 indigenous people returned the next day to blockade the same bridge.

Media censorship has made it difficult to ascertain the extent of the mobilization and protest, particularly outside the capital, and to be certain of the number of people killed or wounded by military gunfire or the number arrested. Human rights activists in Ecuador say they have not seen the current level of repression in their country in the last 20 years. Indigenous peoples have been joined by trade unionists, farmworkers, students, academics, environmentalists, small-scale producers, women's groups and others to resolutely demand the repeal of IMF-supported economic measures. They are putting their lives on the line to stop structural adjustment in Ecuador , affirming that this economic model is clearly neither politically nor economically viable. They want to open a policy dialogue with the government to formulate an alternative economic program.

As the government has not shown willingness to enter into such a dialogue, a national strike has been called for 7 February by a coalition of trade unions, professional associations and others in support of the indigenous mobilization and to demand a repeal of the economic adjustment measures and an open dialogue on the national economic program.

While the Ecuadoran government is repressing protest by large segments of society against economic adjustment measures, the IMF and World Bank, who are responsible for designing and promoting these policies, remain silent. Over nearly 20 years, the IMF and the World Bank have made the implementation of structural adjustment programs a condition of financial support to the government of Ecuador . These programs and the specific economic policies they embrace have placed the major burden of adjustment on the nation's poor and working people, its small farmers and businesses. This is clearly evidenced by the recently concluded SAPRI process in Ecuador – a tripartite initiative to assess the impacts of structural adjustment policies in which the World Bank, government and SAPRIN civil-society network have been jointly involved.

The SAPRI process of consultation and participatory research on the impact of adjustment in Ecuador since 1982 concluded that trade and financial-sector liberalization in Ecuador have led to a marked contraction in the national productive apparatus, particularly of small and medium-scale enterprises, as well as a greater concentration of productive resources. This, in turn, has increased unemployment and underemployment while, along with labor-market "flexibilization" policies, reducing job security. The lack of adequate, stable employment and the further concentration of wealth have generated an increase in poverty and a deterioration in the living conditions of a majority of the Ecuadoran population, conditions that have been extensively documented.

Furthermore, the research reflected the belief held by a majority of citizens that a policy of universal subsidies on certain basic goods – such as gasoline, electricity and cooking fuel -- is necessary until support for the reactivation of national production generates adequate employment and greater income for the poor and middle-income segments of society.

Researchers concluded that targeted subsidies are unviable in Ecuador , where the target group is comprised of the majority of the population and continues to increase. They recommended a reorientation of macroeconomic policy to reactivate production, increase employment generation and substantially improve income levels before removing subsidies or applying measures that negatively affect the living conditions of large segments of Ecuadoran society.

The SAPRI process for review and reform of structural adjustment programs is supported by the Halifax Initiative Coalition, of which the SJC is a member, sitting on the coalition Coordinating Committee. On behalf of the Halifax Initiative, the SJC has just begun a study of the social and environmental impacts of the privatisation that is central to adjustment programs, to be published this summer.

 

The challenges after winning back our water -

The fight against water privatisation in Bolivia

By Sarah Harden Cochabamba , Bolivia January 13, 2001

In April a broad-based movement of labor, peasants, and university students stood behind the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y la Vida (Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life) and to take back their water. Their efforts led to the de-privatization of the local water system--ousting Aguas del Tunari (AdT), Bechtel affiliate-- and substantive changes in water legislation. Once the international corporation left, the challenge for citizens was to monitor the actions of the Government of Bolivia to protect new contracts.

A key element is the reconstruction of the local water company, SEMAPA. When the directors of Aguas del Tunari, the Bechtel affiliate, abandoned Cochabamba , they left SEMAPA with substantial debts. In addition, the political and business elite launched a campaign against the Coordinadora, boycotting and neglecting to pay tariffs imposed by SEMAPA. Although the greater public remains very much in favor of the Coordinadora, the campaign in part has wounded the credibility of SEMAPA.

Just as the Coordinadora motivated protest, now it seeks to channel the energies and creativity necessary to find real alternative solutions to both corrupt public management and impoverishing privatization of public services. The Coordinadora is committed to finding solutions to the water problem that gives lie to the notion that only the private for-profit sector can provide services, and that treats water not as a simple commodity, but as a public good.

The challenges of creating a "social SEMAPA", an efficient company committed to serving the needs of its neediest customers first, are many.

The assurance of SEMAPA's future will depend on obtaining legal and financial stability. SEMAPA, working with the collaboration of a support team designed to articulate a collective vision of SEMAPA's future, through a process of popular consultation.

My household on the edge of the city of Cochabamba receives water twice a week, mostly in the mornings when water pressure rises enough to get a good shower.

With regard to the legal situation, Aguas del Tunari/Bechtel stated in May of 2000 that they intended to take the conflict to international arbitration through the International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World Bank. They are currently suing the Government of Bolivia for close to US $40 million. They want Bolivians to pay for their bad investment!

How will we take on privatization and the global economy?

The answer: reverse the process of globalization, using our access to this system for international good. Instead of selling water as a human need, open to be exploited economically, we will promote it as a basic human right. Working from our community roots, and building on our international networks, Internet connections we will share our struggle. However, this does not mean exploiting or selling the Cochabamba example, but working from our bases to create together an international agreement that protects water.

To the west of Cochabamba , the community of El Paso supports an irrigation system created by members of the community after they won the right over the government-run, privatized model. In thirty days, a team of workers constructed the above ground canal that supplies the community with water.

In Altocochabamba, the highest and poorest urbanized neighborhood in Cochabamba , women used to travel to the bottom of the hill to draw water for their families. In an effort to lug enormous amounts of water back up, often they would hemorrhage and die. While Aguas del Tunari imposed its high tariffs and cried privatized water, the people of Altocochabamba were paying for water they were not receiving because of failed promises. Working with SEMAPA the community has made 800 new connections--a social victory for the city's poorer residents.

The importance of civil action in the struggle for water rights is alive in the histories of these neighborhoods. The alternatives suggest resistance to privatization and effective management of natural resources force people to work as a community. The goal to unite our energies in the global struggle for alternatives is critical.